ABSTRACT

This dissertation argues that Islamic reformism established itself in the district but could not displace the influence of historically grounded shrine-based Islam. Reformist ideas had to negotiate with the mystical ideas and practices, as historically Islam in Mianwali was moderate and inclusive, expressed in form(s) of Sufism. The national narrative of Pakistan, predicated on sharia-oriented Islam propagated exclusion on the basis of sectarian differences, replacing the syncretic and plural traditions.

The first chapter proposes that the relationship between Sufi and local tribal and kinship structure was historically grounded. The relationship was particularly based on the concept of baraka, the power of Sufi to intercede between man and God and his role as mediator between tribes in the midst of socio-economic uncertainties. The relationship of the Sufi with the colonial state contributed towards consolidating this relationship. State’s patronage to Sufis drew them closer to power structure, hence the mediation of Sufi, based upon his spiritual and moral authority over his disciples, was used much to the benefit of colonial regime. With this piety among the Sufis declined.

The second chapter highlights how in the twentieth century, traditional shrine-based Islam came in confrontation with the movements of Islamic reform/revival. At the same time various strands of Islamic reform have become involved in politics, as has also the resistance to it. The uniformity of traditional Islam propagated by Barelwi Sufis and reformist Islam espoused by Deobandi ulama emerged as the popular form of Islam. The second section examines a contestation between modernity and tradition. It seeks out how a Deobandi ideologue, preaching puritanical Islam with an outright rejection of Sufi traditions opened a conflict between the two forms of Islam with a tradition of takfir (exclusion) in a hostile sectarian milieu, fleshed out distinct religious identities.

The third chapter examines that religion as a tool for political mobilization culminated into religious nationalism. It not only generated religious identities but also constructed communally compartmentalized categories, which drove communal wedge into syncretic social ethos. The chapter examines a socio-religious reform movement, spearheaded in reaction to social and economic marginalization of peasant and urban artisan groups at the hands of Hindu commercial class and local elites. The social change was mediated by religion. The chapter will examine how Majlis-i-Ahrar, relying on anti-colonial nationalism articulated communal politics, contested military recruitment in colonial army. It will also scrutinize, how Ahrar launched an anti-feudal
movement in Kalabagh and challenged the traditional power pattern dominated by a few privileged.

The chapter four explicates how national narrative enshrined in sharia-oriented Islam led to exclusionary discourse against minority religious groups in which Ahmadiyya and Shia were prominent. Khatam-e-Nabuwwat movements of 1953 and 1974 were discussed as an instrument of exclusion and religious rhetoric to gain political mileage. The chapter will also explicate a dichotomy between high ranking Ulema representing various religious denominations, were united on the issue of Khatam-e-Nabuwwat, whereas peripheral Ulema, associated with different religio-political organisations like (JUI), (JUP) etc, incited dissension. The chapter also explores how anti-Ahmadiyya movement provided anti-Shia front and the same principle of exclusion was applied on Shia minority in Pakistan. It will discuss Maulana Allahyar Chakralwi’s anti-Shia movement in the highly charged atmosphere of Shia-Sunni sectarian animosity. Chapter five will examine Maulana Allahyar’s sufi-inspired reformist movement launched to contest the prosyletising activities of Shias. The reformist message was sent across through the formation of tablighi jamaat and its expansion in the cadre of armed forces of Pakistan.